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insure that no hormonal additive has
been administered.
Another option would be to set
standards limiting hormone residues
in meat products to safe or precau-
tionary levels and to impose a ban
when the standards were violated.
Such standards are already defined
by an international institution, such
as the Codex Commission, which is
shielded from direct political influ-
ence. The latter instrument raises
the issue of harmonization of stan-
dards. Some countries may not
agree with international standards
as was the case with the EU. Harmo-
nization goes against the presump-
tion of most economists that
harmonization of standards among
heterogeneous trade partners with
different tastes is not optimal.
Hence, in practice, finding accept-
able standards may be difficult.
An important question induced
by the hormone trade dispute is:
How safe are growth hormones?
Based on more than 30 years of
hormone use in the United States,
there is no evidence of hormone
residues in meat exceeding recom-
mended standards, or of adverse
human health effects coming from
this process attribute of beef. For
most hormones, the absence of
health consequences hinges on
good veterinary and animal hus-
bandry practices in hormone use.
These good practices imply that
hormone residues are minimal and
correspond to naturally occurring
hormone residues levels present in
animal products. Hormones, both
natural and synthetic, tend to have
short half-lives, in the order of a few
days. This means their concentra-
tion decreases by half within a few
days and to nearly undetectable
levels within a few weeks. Deviations
from these good practices, such as
overdose, late injection, or improper
injection forms, can have adverse
health consequences. Hormones do
have health consequences and can
be carcinogenic at high dosages.
Hence, control and producer educa-
tion on appropriate procedures
appear to be essential components
of a well-functioning system. t
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One thing seems certain: weare now familiar with yetanother acronym.  GMO
stands for genetically modified
organism and designates a living
entity (such as a bacterium, plant, or
animal) whose genome has been
modified by recombinant DNA
technology.  The ability to alter the
genetic makeup of organisms directly
by such methods (i.e., transgenic)
constitutes the hallmark of modern
biotechnology and has ushered in a
new era in agricultural research.
The promises of biotechnology in
agriculture have at last begun to be
realized, and in recent years an
increasing stream of transgenic
plants have been approved and
marketed mostly (but not only) in the
United States.  Two such crops now
well known to midwestern farmers
are Roundup Ready (RR) soybeans
and Bt corn.   For RR crops, the
relevant genetic material comes from
a particular strain of Agrobacterium
that, once introduced into the plant,
confers resistance to glyphosate
herbicide.  For Bt crops, the genetic
material of interest comes from
another bacterium, Bacillus
thuringiensis; once inserted into
maize, it confers to the plant the
ability to kill the European corn borer.
ACCEPTANCE OF GMOS
The GMOs, by and large, have
been welcomed by U.S. agriculture
and by a number of other countries
(notably Canada and Argentina).
These new crops were virtually
unknown before 1996 but have
experienced breathtaking adoption
rates.  For example, in 1999 more
than 50 percent of the soybean crop
grown in the United States is geneti-
cally modified (at least 40 percent of
U.S. corn and about 40 percent of
U.S. cotton are also transgenic).  For
the next crop year it is estimated
that 100 percent of the soybeans
grown in Argentina will be herbicide
resistant.  But GMOs have struck a
different cord in Europe, where they
have met with numerous obstacles
from consumers, businesses,
policymakers, and regulators.
Safe food is at issue.  Transfer-
ring genetic material from one
organism to a completely different
one is perceived by some as unnatu-
ral, and it is feared that the presence
of a foreign genetic code may induce
the transformed organism to pro-
duce unwanted toxins and allergens.
The absence of risk from eating such
food, it is claimed, has not been
adequately documented.
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The environment is another
concern.  It is feared that the herbi-
cide- and insect-resistant traits of new
crops may spread to other plants in
the wild; that genetically modified
plants may be deleterious to other
species (as in the recent debate on
whether or not Bt corn harms the
larval stage of monarch butterflies);
and that specific genetic sequences
conferring antibiotic resistance,
which are used as “markers” in the
genetic engineering process, may
unwittingly aid the development of
antibiotic resistant germs that could
eventually harm humans.
An array of related issues are
championed by particular segments
of the European public.  Some, for
instance, perceive the whole idea of
transferring genetic material be-
tween different organisms as unethi-
cal.  Others question whether
private research and development
activities in a rapidly consolidating
biotechnology sector is concentrat-
ing too much power in the hands of a
very few multinational companies.
GMO REGULATION IN EUROPE
The novelty of GMOs has re-
quired the introduction of specific
regulations in most countries.  The
United States has chosen to rely
heavily on existing regulatory tools,
with limited specific adaptations that
entail a role for three separate federal
agencies that enjoy widespread
public confidence (U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, and Food and Drug
Administration).  The European
Union (EU), with a unique institu-
tional setting, has chosen to rely
more on new legislation.
The EU is not a country; it is the
collection of 15 (rather different)
countries united in the pursuit (not
yet fully realized) of political and
economic union.  Regulatory activi-
ties in the EU are seen as the domain
of politicians as much as bureau-
crats.  Both European bureaucrats
and politicians, it must be said, have
a less-than-spotless record in such
matters, as evidenced by the recent
debacles associated with the British
“mad cow” disease and this year’s
Belgian dioxin scare.  As a conse-
quence, European consumers have
developed skepticism about what
they are told is safe to eat, and
policymakers have read into that a
need for more action on the regula-
tory front.  Be that as it may, the
legislative underpinning of the EU
regulation of GMOs has two pillars:
the 1990 Directive on the deliberate
release of GMOs into the environ-
ment (Directive 90/220/EEC), and
the 1997 legislation concerning
novel foods (Regulation 258/97/EC).
A Complicated Process
The 1990 Directive constitutes
the backbone of EU legislation
concerning GMOs.  Its purpose is to
protect human health and the
environment when releasing GMOs
or placing them on the market.
While it was intended to work
somewhat like the U.S. system, this
legislation also reflects the peculiar
institutional structure of the EU.
The complex regulatory procedure
starts by requiring anyone wishing
to release or market a GMO to
“notify” the competent authority of
any one EU country by supplying a
host of documentation (including a
risk assessment).  This country (the
rapporteur) should provide an initial
evaluation within 90 days.
If the rapporteur supports the
GMO, the dossier is forwarded to the
European Commission (effectively,
the executive government of the
EU), which, after considerations of
its own, sends it to the competent
authorities of each of the other EU
countries.  These countries have 60
days to evaluate and respond.  If the
Commission receives no objection,
it informs the rapporteur country,
which can then proceed by issuing
the final written authorization.
If any one country objects,
however, the matter must be re-
solved following a protocol specified
in the Directive itself, which entails a
role for the Commission, a role for a
standing EU committee, and a role
for the EU Council of Ministers (the
chief EU decision body for legisla-
tive and political matters).  Once a
decision is made it is binding for all
member countries.  Still, under the
authority of the Directive (article
16), individual countries can provi-
sionally prohibit marketing of an
approved GMO on their territory
citing possible risk to human health
and the environment.
Because the 1990 Directive did
not apply to nonliving substances
extracted from GMOs, the EU devel-
oped additional legislation to regu-
late food produced from GMOs. The
1997 Regulation identifies a “novel
food” as one not previously con-
sumed to a significant degree within
the EU. Specifically, the 1997 Regula-
tion applies to food containing or
consisting of GMOs, and foods
produced from but not containing
GMOs. Because RR soybeans and Bt
corn were already commercialized in
the EU prior to the introduction of
this Regulation (under the authority
of the 1990 Directive), ad hoc legisla-
tion was required to extend the
definition of “novel food” to products
of these genetically modified crops
as well (Regulation 1139/98).
The 1997 novel foods regulation
establishes a mondatory EU-wide
pre-market approval for all foods
obtained from GMOs and it man-
dates “labeling” of novel foods and
novel food ingredients. Specifically,
consumers should be informed
when a food contins GMOs. This
lavelling feature is highly controver-
Regulatory activities in the
EU are seen as the domain
of politicians as much as
bureaucrats.
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sial and sets EU regulation apart
from that of the United States (where
no mandatory labeling of foods
obtained from GMOs exists).
AN AMBIGUOUS PROCESS
While the EU regulatory struc-
ture for GMOs is ambitious in scope,
it is fraught with ambiguities and
loopholes.  The timelines laid down
in the Directive and the Regulation
are often violated.  Article 16 of the
Directive has been abused by some
countries to provide indefinite
restrictions on EU-approved GMOs
(Austria and Luxembourg).  In
certain instances, rapporteur coun-
tries have withheld issuing the final
written authorization even after all
approval hurdles had been cleared
(France). As a result, only a handful
of GMOs have so far been approved
in the EU (they include Novartis’ Bt
corn, Monsanto’s RR soybeans and
Bt corn, and AgrEvo’s LibertyLink
corn, but exclude many other
transformation events already
approved and used in U.S. crop
production).
With public concerns about
GMOs munting, the system has
effectively stalled. Indeed, no new
GMO crop has been approved in the
EU for more than ayear; and at their
June 1999 meeting, the EU council of
(Environmental) Ministers appeared
to agree on continuing this de facto
moratorium on new approvals.
The strict labeling requirements
are also somewhat empty at present.
For example, it ha yet not been
decided what exactly it means for a
food to be “free” of GMOs (i.e.,
critical threshold levels need to be
agreed on), and testing methods to
monitor a label’s claims concerning
GMOs have not been specified.
Efforts to integrate and stream-
line EU legislation on GMOs have
been held back by the mass resigna-
tion of the Commission in March
1999. The new, recently appointed
Commission, and they newly elected
European Parliament (yet another
EU institution, which shares legisla-
tive power with the Council), will
have their hands full in sorting out
the problems under the watchful
eyes of a somewhat confused, but
increasingly dissatisfied, public.
Given the situation, little substantial
progress may be expected in the
near future. For example, in light of
the current de facto moratorium on
using the 1990 Directive, approval
of new GMO crops may be delayed
as far out as 2002.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE
In a world where talk of global
markets is commonplace, it comes
as no surprise that the European
struggle to sort out its position on
GMOs has implications for U.S.
agriculture.  Delay in approving new
GMO crops in Europe means lower
than expected revenue for U.S. life
science multinationals that are at
the forefront of new crop develop-
ment.  On the other hand, from the
producer’s point of view, this delay
per se is penalizing EU farmers by
hampering their competitive posi-
tion (compared with U.S. and
Argentine farmers).
The EU labeling laws, however,
may hold perhaps the most serious
implications for U.S. agriculture.
Some believe that food labeled as
containing GMOs will be less
appealing to European consumers,
and in fact many EU retailers have
undertaken to supply what consum-
ers apparantly want: GMO-free food.
Some food chaines and retailers
have gone further by rpomising to
shun foods and food ingredients
containing GMOs. If these trends
are sustained, they would create
incentives to develop handling and
processing systems characterized
by “identity preservation.”
This point was brought home
suddenly a few months ago when
major U.S. commodity handlers
(including Archer Daniels Midland
and Cargill) announced that they
would not buy maize produced with
GMO varieties not yet approved for
importation in the EU. Keeping GMO
crops and food separated from their
traditional counterparts at every
stage of the production and market-
ing chain will be a costly undertak-
ing, which may eventually be
reflected in a price “premium” for
GMO-free commodities (or a “dis-
count” for GMO commodities).
Given the trade implications of
the EU regulation of GMOs, there is
considerable concern in the United
States, where the export sector is
vital to the marketing of all major
crops.   Some U.S. officials are
complaining loudly that the EU
labeling law constitutes an inad-
missible technical barrier to trade,
and have threatened to take the
matter up within the World Trade
Organization.  Whereas such an
attitude is understandable, it
oversimplifies the issues. It would
appear that European consumers’
concerns are genuine, and that the
preoccupation of EU policymakers
is to address those concerns
(rather that to exploit them for
protectionist purposes).
If a GMO trade war were to break
out, it would dwarf the recent
banana and beef-hormone confronta-
tions between the EU and the United
States.  The June 1999 meeting of the
G8 group of industrialized countries
considered the matter, and bought
some time by charging the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and
Development with providing advice
on the global implications of GMO
foods and crops.   In the meantime,
a serious campaign of scientifically
based education aimed at consum-
ers and the general public that
emphasizes facts and eschews
rhetoric is overdue on both sides of
the Atlantic. t
. . . in light of the current
de facto moratorium on using
the 1999 Directive, approval
of new GMO crops may be
delayed as far out as 2002.
